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The Economic Framework for Monitoring and Holding Corporate Management to Account

المصدر: مجلة العلوم القانونية والسياسية
الناشر: الجمعية العلمية للبحوث والدراسات الاستراتيجية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Al Hawamdeh, Ahmed Mohammad (Author)
المجلد/العدد: س8, ع3
محكمة: نعم
الدولة: العراق
التاريخ الميلادي: 2018
الصفحات: 61 - 102
ISSN: 2222-7288
رقم MD: 909313
نوع المحتوى: بحوث ومقالات
اللغة: الإنجليزية
قواعد المعلومات: IslamicInfo, EcoLink
مواضيع:
كلمات المؤلف المفتاحية:
Institutional Investors’ Activism | Institutional Investors’ Apathy | Corporate Governance
رابط المحتوى:
صورة الغلاف QR قانون

عدد مرات التحميل

17

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المستخلص: It is alleged that there are twelve main reasons which possibly affect investors’ willingness to hold corporate managers to account. These reasons are: thin equity; diversification; liquidity of shares; reliance on other investors; apathy of shareholders’ agents; keeping access to soft information; comparison with other investment managers’ performance and market indices; conflict of interests; short termism; corporate managers’ manipulation of the general meeting’s agenda; political retaliation; and, investing in index funds. By gauging institutional investors and investment managers’ opinions, this paper examines whether or not these alleged reasons are truly inherent in the economic framework of the UK market which necessarily affects at least some institutional investors and investment managers’ willingness to hold corporate managers to account. This paper gives a useful insight into respondents’ opinions about these twelve reasons, concluding that the economic framework of the market fails to support institutional investors and investment managers in holding corporate managers to account.

ISSN: 2222-7288

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