المستخلص: |
This article examines, through a model of incomplete contract theory, the effectiveness of each of the modes of public asset management, in particular Anglo Saxon public-private partnership, public service delegation, and public management. While integrating the corruption variable, the results from the analysis of this model show that the role of public authority varies significantly in each of these organizational structures and highlights the conditions under which each of these organizational structures Reveals more effective than others.
Cet article examine a travers un modele de theorie des contrats incomplets l'efficacite de chacun des modes de gestion des biens publics notamment le partenariat public-prive de type anglo-saxon, la delegation de service public, et la gestion publique. Tout en integrant la variable corruption, les resultats issus de l’analyse de ce modele montrent que le role de l‘autorite publique varie de maniere importante dans chacune de ces structures organisationnelles et mettent en exergue les conditions dans lesquelles chacune de ces structures organisationnelles se revele plus efficace que les autres.
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