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The article examines the results and repercussions of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" battle on the components of the Arab thought in managing the conflict that prevailed before it. The article believes that the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation on October 7, 2023, constituted a qualitative, multi-dimensional transformation at the tactical and strategic levels. The article indicates that Arab thought mainstream is betting on the possibility of achieving real peace and a breakthrough in ending the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 through negotiation with the Israeli occupying state. The agreements signed with Israel and the accompanying hopes formed a framework for official and political Arab thought. Arab decisions and policies have been revolving in this orbit for many decades, especially in the last three decades. However, Israel has continued to occupy and Judaize the land, seize holy sites, practice grave violations against the Palestinian people, and violate all international covenants and laws in this regard. The repercussions of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" battle created intellectual, political, security and military differences simultaneously, as it overturned the notions of possible peace and the notions of imbalance in the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel. It also revealed the level of Israel's remarkable inability to confront an effective and organized Palestinian resistance inside Palestine, as this successful military operation proved vice versa. Its potential implications for the future Arab-Israeli conflict future are to consolidate the Palestinian movement's unity and the perception of a possible end to the Israeli occupation of their lands. This success also shocked the theories of Israeli security, broke the alleged prestige of its army and security services, and revealed the extent of the intellectual and strategic deficit that surrounds the minds of the Israeli political leaders in their dealings with the Palestinian issue and the Palestinian people with disdain and neglect. It moreover revealed that Israel is vulnerable to defeat, especially since, 85 days after the barbaric air strikes on civilians on October 7 and the land aggression on October 27, it was unable to achieve any significant military goals or targets. The successes of the first operation and what followed in the ground war provided a new environment for dealing with Israel as a state capable of being defeated and besieged. The gathering of comprehensive Arab civilized thought in conflict management, based on strength, cohesion, self-confidence, and the realism of dealing with the enemy, constitutes essential elements for putting pressure on the nerves of the Arab elites. The ruler and the leadership of the Palestinian National Authority ought to review its accounts and make essential changes in the methodology of dealing with Israel and in looking at its future in the region, as well as reshape its policies to force the Israeli military to end the occupation of the Palestinian lands.
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