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This study addresses the issue of commands and in¬terdictions and whether they require repetition or im¬mediate performance. When the Legislator demands obligations and forbids prohibitions; are they to be per¬petually observed? Similarly, is immediate obedience required? In other words, can this (i.e., the necessity of obeying a certain command or abstaining from a prohi¬bition perpetually and immediately) be deduced from the linguistic structure [imperative form of the verb] alone or can they be deduced from other evidences? To answer this question, it was necessary to take up a number of matters. These include: - Whether a single action or a repeated one is denoted by a general, unrestricted command. - Whether a command that is made conditional upon a certain stipulation or quality is to be observed every time the condition or quality occurs. - Whether consecutive commands require repetition of the act or simply denote emphasis. - Whether a general command denotes immediacy or permissibility of delay. - Whether general, unrestricted interdictions denote abstention from the prohibited act once or perpetually and whether that act must be acted upon immediately or can be delayed. At the end of the discussion of each of the above, the researcher mentions the various opinions, and the ap¬plications that are derived from the dominant opinion, or in some cases, all of the opinions. This is so that we may explore their effects on legal texts and substantive juristic issues since this is the most important goal of the study of the Principles of Jurisprudence. The study concludes that the linguistic structure of a general, unrestricted command independent of other circumstances and considerations denotes neither a single performance of an act nor its repetition but only its observance; a single performance of the act fulfills the obligation. Moreover, conditional commands denote repetition only if we maintain that general commands denote repetition. The preferred opinion is that it does not denote repetition if we admit that a general command does not. With respect to identical and consecutive commands that are not joined by a conjunction, whose target acts are capable of being repeated and there are no impedi¬ments to their repetition, the dominant position is that only the second command denotes repetition. As for general commands that are not time restrict¬ed, scholars who maintain that they denote repeti¬tion maintain that they also denote immediacy. But the dominant opinion of those scholars who maintain that general commands do not denote repetition, is that such commands may either demand immediacy or permit delay. There is nothing specific to the com¬mand itself that indicates either of the above, unless there are other related circumstances indicating either immediacy or permissibility of delay. Immediate obser-vance of an action or the possibility of its delay is ex¬traneous to the act itself though immediate action is recommended. The dominant opinion of the majority of scholars is that unqualified interdictions, in the absence of contextual indications to the contrary, denote immediate and per¬petual abstention from the prohibited act. Scholars are unanimous that if a proscription is quali¬fied to denote repetition, it must be interpreted accord¬ingly. But there are two opinions concerning a proscrip¬tion restricted to a single performance. The first is that such a proscription is to be interpreted accordingly. The second is that it denotes repetition just like unqualified proscriptions. Similarly, if a proscription is qualified to denote immediacy, it must be interpreted accordingly.
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