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|a بالضرورة، فإن استراتيجية حل المأزق العراقي هي بطبيعتها مشروطة ككل الاستراتيجيات، وأياً كان ما سنختار فعله في العراق، لا يمكننا أن نكون متأكدين من النتيجة الحتمية، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بالنتيجة على المدى الطويل. وقد يكون بوسعنا وضع البلاد على طريق جديد، ولكن لا يمكننا التأكد من أنه سيبقى على هذا الطريق. وبالتأكيد فإن عدم التأكيد بخصوص المستقبل -شرط وجودي-لا يمكن أن يكون حجة أو سبباً جيداً لاستمرار احتلال العراق. وإلا فإننا لن نرحل أبداً. ولكن يمكن للولايات المتحدة أن تستريح من ذلك، فالاحتلال العسكري ليس الآلة السياسة الوحيدة تحت تصرف السياسة، إنه فقط أكثر تطرفاً، وكلفة. ونهاية الاحتلال في العراق لن يكون نهاية القدرة الأمريكية على التأثير على المشهد العراقي، سواء بوسائل عسكرية أو غير عسكرية.
|b The key to enabling total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels and with Iraq's neighbors - especially Syria and Iran. The proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for the insurgency, inside and outside the country. This would allow the United States to shift resources to the training mission and to adopt other de-escalatory measures - most importantly: a withdrawal time line. The strategic price of this diplomatic initiative would be a return to self-governance in Sunni areas, a guaranteed level of representation for these areas in the national assembly, an end to broad-brush measures of de-Baathification, an amnesty for most indigenous insurgents and for most former Baathists, and a de-escalation of the US confrontation with Syria and Iran regarding a range of issues. In conjunction with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States would announce a tentative time line for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq — associated with training milestones. Also: US forces would end major offensive sweeps inside the country, adopt a defensive posture, and shift the emphasis of their activity to training Iraqi security forces. Finally: the Iraqi government would re-activate portions of the old army — partly as a confidence-building measure, but also in order to (i) rob insurgent organizations of their recruiting base, (ii) augment the power of the new Iraqi security forces, and (iii) produce a better ethnic balance in the new forces (which are currently dominated by Kurds and Shiites). As new forces increase in capacity, US forces would be removed, further reducing a stimulus of insurgent action. Four hundred days - 57 weeks - is sufficient time to complete several Iraqi training cycles, including field exercises for many units at the battalion and brigade levels. Some division level training also can occur. Given sufficient resources (24,000 training personnel), 100,000 Iraqi security personnel can receive remedial training and another 80,000 new personnel can be trained and exercised during this period. Together with the full provision of all appropriate equipment, this development effort can yield Iraqi security forces that are several times more capable than those it controls in mid-2005. After thirteen months, the only foreign military assets remaining in Iraq would be a small monitoring and training mission with a security detail: less than 10,000 foreign civilian and military personnel in all. US troops should constitute no more than one-third of the military component — that is, approximately 2,000 troops. This mission should be conducted under a three-year UN mandate and joint NATO- international command. In addition, the United States might maintain a 25,000-person rapid reaction task force in the region, but outside either Iraq or Saudi Arabia
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