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This paper answers the question of the permissibility of using nouns for ta’lil (determining the effective or operable cause for a ruling). Islamic legal theorists have agreed on the validity of making ta’lil based on discernible regulated features. However they differed on what can and cannot be used for making ta’lil both in qiyas (analogical deduction) and other authoritative sources for rule derivation. These include nouns, whether derivatives or appellations. To reach an opinion, the researcher presents the four opinions on the matter as follows: - absolute permissibility; - absolute impermissibility; - differentiating between the derivative (which can be used for ta’lil) from the appellation (which cannot be used for ta’lil); - differentiating between the derivative (which can be used for ta’lil) and the appellation which can only be used for ta’lil if its rationalization evokes 'illiya (reason for which a particular law is believed to have been established by the Lawgiver) which in turn, includes whatever fulfills the purpose of Islamic law (that which benefits man or staves off harm). If not, then it is not valid to use for ta’lil. The researcher deems maintaining the permissibility of using nouns to establish ta’lil the dominant opinion because legal causes are merely indications for rulings and there is no harm in considering a noun as an indication for a ruling. This is the basis on which the proponents of this opinion have based their argument. It is indeed a strong basis which is why they espoused it. Moreover, the absolute impermissibility of using nouns for ta’lil, or even some of its types undermines many of the subsidiary issues and applications which have been widely mentioned in the books of jurisprudence. The effective causes of legal rulings have been based on nouns , demonstrated by the rulings issued by the various schools of jurisprudence as is likewise evident in many of the legal texts and subsidiary issues which have been mentioned in this research to substantiate the author’s preponderant opinion.
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