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| 024 |
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|3 10.12816/0003576
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| 041 |
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|a ara
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| 044 |
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|b الأردن
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| 110 |
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|9 4322
|a هيئة التحرير
|e عارض
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| 245 |
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|a ثمن استئناف المفاوضات مع إسرائيل تأمينها استراتيجياً
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| 260 |
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|b مركز دراسات الشرق الاوسط
|c 2013
|g ربيع
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| 300 |
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|a 7 - 13
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| 336 |
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|a بحوث ومقالات
|b Article
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|b Obama's visit in March 2013 to Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority carried huge surprises with respect to shifts in the Middle East. It comes in light of the problems that the U.S. policy faces on one hand, and the strategic and security situation \ for Israel on the other. \ Three incidents of such surprises have accompanied and followed this visit. They already form the interceptor to the possibility of the deep and wide strategic change in the Middle East. Such a change is believed to have enough dynamic power to modify the balance of power with Israel in favor of the Arab project to liberate Palestine and to implement the right of return for the Palestinian people. \ If these changes succeed, they are supposed to challenge Israeli security and project. They will be followed by negative geo-political change on the political status of Israel. \ The Obama's gift to Israel included the transform of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa cause from the Palestinian responsibility to the Hashemite King of Jordan on both religious and legal levels. Such a shift exempts Palestinians from the most difficult file in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. This cause used to be considered a heavy burden obstructive to reach an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The second gift was the resumption of Turkish relations with Israel to ease the unrest in the strategic environment surrounding Israel. The third gift was the retreat of Abass, Fatah's leader and Authority president, from the earlier Cairo agreement with Hamas under the patron of Egypt. He insists, instead, to form the new government under his premier and to go to the presidential and legislative elections immediately within three months. \ So this is the price that Benjamin Netanyahu received in advance to resume negotiations with Palestinians. On the other hand the price that Palestinians will gain is not yet clear for what they have paid. \ Based on these regards, the analysis of these variables opens the opportunity to accept the idea that the U.S. still have enough momentum to restore the strategic security of Israel. This effort is aimed to challenge the Arab revolutions' impacts on Israel at the strategic level. \ Such conclusion shows the disability shown by the Arab and Palestinian resistance, on one hand, and the Arab revolutionary forces, on the other, who couldn’t invest in the Arab spring change to restore and consolidate the Arab position against the Israeli aggression. \ Hence, it is the best time to fulfill the Arab peoples' demand to redesign and develop the Arab strategic vision towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause at both public and official levels.
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| 653 |
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|a السياسة الخارجية
|a المفاوضات
|a إسرائيل
|a فلسطين
|a القضية الفلسطينية
|a باراك حسين أوباما ، رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
|a الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي
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| 773 |
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|4 العلوم السياسية
|6 Political Science
|c 001
|e Middle East Studies Journal
|f Maǧallaẗ dirāsāt šarq awsaṭiyyaẗ
|l 063
|m مج 17, ع 63
|o 0836
|s مجلة دراسات شرق أوسطية
|v 017
|x 1811-8208
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| 856 |
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|u 0836-017-063-001.pdf
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| 930 |
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|d y
|p y
|q y
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| 995 |
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|a EcoLink
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| 995 |
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|a HumanIndex
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| 999 |
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|c 414410
|d 414410
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