| المستخلص: |
The study of the balance of power between the conflict parties after approving the quiet is basically aimed at recognizing the nature, size and approaches of the general shifts arising in Hamas and Israel. The paper focuses on two main subjects. The first is the context of both parties at the beginning of the war and the later local, regional (Arab) and international shifts. The second relates to the targets of the Israel aggression, such as disarming the resistance, isolating it from its social support and building an open Arab alliance against it, in particular, and the Gaza Strip, in general. The study concludes that there are two types of variables in this regard. One of them is associated with strategic shifts, which could be employed to introduce major changes in the tracks and approaches of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the long run. These often have to do with the political culture of a broad segment of the Palestinian people and the Arab milieu. The other type is related to momentary tactical and material shifts, represented by Israel’s inability to accomplish its goals. On the one hand, it could not disarm the resistance or even set the subject on the negotiation table. In addition, a counter-alliance was stronger than the Arab alliance which it could not form. On the other hand, Hamas and the Gaza Strip achieved much more than Israel did at international official and public levels. Furthermore, the war was a major lever for national unity and reconciliation. In conclusion, there are a number of future policies which need to be employed to guide the changes in a way that sustains the Palestinian rights. In other words, the national, Arab, regional and international accomplishments need to be efficiently invested.
|
