| المستخلص: |
This paper aims at exploring the relationship between rentier states and the economic legal infrastructure in these countries. Kuwait was chosen as a case study and the legislative production process and the structure of the Kuwaiti parliamant was analyzed from a law and economic perspective. The economic structure in Kuwait was explored and then the rentier nature of the Kuwaiti economy was identified. Later on, the law and economic analysis of the economic regulations infrastructure was followed. This was done via implementing a number of law and economic theories. The results revealed that the transaction costs associated with the legislative process in Kuwait is high due to the absence of regulatory framework that deals and acknowledge the formation of political parties. In addition, the constituencies structure exacerbated the situation by limiting thd choices for the voters and it concentrated the fragmentation in the structure of the parliament members. This also accompanied with a new phenomenon that became known as “Services MP”. Further, the fact that the public sector dominates major economic activities had resulted with a very weak interest groups that can demand for more efficient economic regulations. Moreover, the demand for economic regulations is very weak as 75% of the voters revealed that they have never asked their MPs to initiate economic regulation bills. After examining the bills that have been introduced by MPs the results showed that 91% of these bills were not related to the economy. The final results revealed that the current structure of the parliamant and electiom laws are economically inefficient as they increase the costs to produce legislations, and the economic structure, which is dominated by the public sector, hindered the development of any active interest groups that can boost the demand for economic regulation.
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