| Abstract: |
The March 17, 2015 Knesset elections resulted in the victory of the Likud party, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, with thirty seats. Opinion polls had predicted only 26 seats. On the other hand, its rival Zionist camp (consisting of both Labor and Movement parties) was unexpectedly defeated, winning only 24 seats, which the opinion polls had given 27- 28 seats. The number of seats, which constitutes 25% of the Knesset, guarantees Netanyahu the request by the President of the State of Israel to form his own fourth government. In addition, the winning of the center-right and extreme right paves the way for a full right-wing cabinet. On the other hand, this election produced, for the first time, a new phenomenon among the Arab Palestinians in Israel, when they went to the ballot boxes as one bloc with four parties and political lists. Though not taking a complete form, and in need for further development, it marks the unity of the Palestinians in Israel in one entity to demand equal rights as citizens and confront the racial tide common among the Israelis. In Parliament, in the milieu of Israeli parties and among large segments of the Israeli public, the Arabs are considered terrorists, undesirable and highly suspicious. This is frankly expressed in the election propaganda in which Netanyahu appeared to represent his Likud party on the ballot day. He called on the Israeli public to go to the polls because the Arabs in Israel are going in large numbers with buses to move them, warning that the Jews will lose control of the state. This propaganda secured Netanyahu a large number of votes, making him reap such a surprising victory. In the final analysis, this election will not change the political map in Israel, but it will enhance the position of the right-wing camp made up of Likud, Shas, Our Home Israel, the Jewish House Party, "All of Us" – led by Ekhalon, a breakaway of Likud – and United Torah. This combination gives Netanyahu 67 out of 120 seats in the Parliament. The new government, to be formed by Netanyahu of the above formula, would face a number of central issues, such as the following: ‐ The negotiations with the Palestinians: how to continue in light of Netanyahu's statements during the election that he did not favor a two-state solution ‐ The US administration, which considered his statement to be gravely serious because it undermines its own mediation and patronage of the settlement project fitting the size of its interests in the Middle East ‐ Iran, as he challenged the US President Obama's administration ‐ Other ongoing crises and shifts in the Middle East for several years, and ‐ Very thorny internal economic files. The central question here is: can a right government, led by Netanyahu, stand or suffer from internal disintegration as a result of discrepancies between its parties’ visions for a number of files? Or will it carry on until the end of the term in spite of these contradictions, by Netanyahu’s management of such files in which he is an expert but without solutions?
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