المستخلص: |
This study investigates the relationship between managerial incentives to earnings management and cost stickiness. I argue that when managers have incentives to earnings management, they tend to increase costs less for an increase, in sales and to aggressively cut resources for a decrease in sales and thus cost stickiness decreases. Three proxies are used for management incentives to earnings management; namely, management incentive to avoid loss, incentive to avoid earning decrease, and incentive to avoid loss and/ or earning decrease. A sample of 940 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2017 is used. The results support my hypotheses and I find that when managers have incentive to manage earnings, costs exhibit an anti-sticky behavior. These results shed light on the role of motivations underlying managerial decisions in affecting firms’ cost behavior.
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