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The United States needs a new strategy to remove most of the American and allied army units out of Iraq within 18 months, based on US interest, and with the least military, economic and political costs. The US army faces much insurgence, mainly from the remnants of the Ba'th regime and Iraqi fundamentalist Islamists in league with foreign terrorists and support of some of the Sunni Arab community in the country. Their strength is now three or four times what it was in the Autumn of 2003 (just after the war on Iraq), and increasing. The American presence is invoking resistance and reducing Iraqi government incentives to take steps to combat it. The situation becomes worse because of Iraqi political leaders of Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites, who are unwilling to reach hard compromises as long as America remains in Iraq. Neighboring countries are appearing to be looking the other way as some of their young people are traveling to Iraq where they may die. A civil war may brake out in that country which the US must try to end as soon as possible to deflect the possibility of Al Qaeda sympathizers from coming to power in the country. If a civil war escalates as US forces withdraw, it is likely to come to a political stalemate, and this is what Washington should aim at. This outcome should be a starting point for a political compromise by the three Iraqi parties, Kurds, Shiites and Arab Sunnis, based on the creation of a loose federal structure in which the three parties may be induced to support a weak central state whose principal purpose would be to defend Iraq diplomatically from its neighbors while the US ensures the country remain independent. The US should be able to prevent any party from getting control of the oil revenues or oilfields or arms, and prevent the Arab regions from becoming a safe haven for Al Qaeda. Military disengagements require a serious military and diplomatic strategy, starting with a campaign to remind other nations of US interest in Iraq and the Gulf. American military planners should develop strategies to defend Iraq. With 18 months to withdraw, the US military should train an Iraqi army capable of large-scale operations. If needed, small US special force contingents can be attached to principal Iraqi units. Once US ground forces leave Iraq, many Sunni Arabs may no longer tolerate the presence of foreign fighters. America should be able to buy allies among the Sunnis. Shiite and Kurds may also see that they have interest in Sunni Arab cooperation. Neighboring countries will have strong interest in strictly controlling their borders to prevent insurgents from flowing into Iraq. During an 18 month interval, Iraqi government and security forces will be able to focus on improving their capability and take defensive and offensive measures and American forces may not need to withdraw during the first 12 months. However, and after leaving, their presence will still be in the Gulf to offer any assistance.
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