المستخلص: |
In the footsteps of some Medieval Latin philosophers some scholars have wondered whether Ibn Sīnā considers that being is univocal. This issue remains problematic as paradoxically the univocity of being is far from being a univocal concept. I shall examine Metaphysics, I, 5, and Isagoge, I, 12 in the Shifā', as well as the independent Epistle on the Disparition of Vain Intelligibles, in order to attempt to determine whether in these passages Ibn Sīnā may be using some kind of univocity of being. If such is the case, what does univocity of being mean for him? Is it purely logical or also metaphysical? How would he conceive of some kind of univocity of being in dealing with both mental and real existence, for instance, when he reflects on the indifference of natures? Besides, not ail natures are susceptible of both a real existence.
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