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|b In the last 3 years, the political Arab and regional scene has witnessed a number of developments, which could lead to a dramatic shift in the entire region. In spite of the continuous changes of events and circumstances, making it so difficult to predict the future, most shifts have affected the nature and track of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The issue represents a dependent, rather than an independent, case. It is subject to a set of regional and international variables more than relying on internal factors. Therefore, analyzing such developments, especially those in the Arab World and the Region, would help foresee their impact on the future of the conflict firstly on its components and secondly on its approaches. The two basic approaches which directly affect the issue and, thus, need exploration are the Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement and the Palestinian resistance. It is found that the general Arab scene has had a number of internal impacts affecting the conflict and reviving morale to Arab peoples. There are also the absence of the form of axes which spread before the Arab Spring, like those of moderation and resistance as well as the weakness of the two biggest Arab regimes in Egypt and Syria. At the regional level, Iran and Turkey have been the most significant. On the one hand, Tehran has been paying little attention to the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, Israel is likely to make use of the US-Iranian rapprochement to achieve gains at the expense of the issue. On the other hand, as Ankara is seen by the Arabs to constitute a regional model for an overall reform, it is expected to have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause. This is due to its distinguished role in internal Palestinian relations as well as its support to the peace process. As for the Palestinian developments, there are several current internal and external problems. Of the first type is the weakness of many Palestinian movements. Of the second type is the fragility of the Arab axis, which is supposed to be supportive of the Palestinians. In conclusion, the study presents the following scenarios. At the level of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it could either stay the same, open partly or escalate with a complete dead-end. At the Arab and regional levels, dictatorships are expected to receive more support, which springs from the state of peace seen in the conflict for decades. A second possibility is the rise of an Islamist revolutionary project, which would reproduce a state of fear and instability to the conflict. A third possibility is a partial success of the uprisings, leading to better political and economic conditions in the Arab World, but without engaging in the conflict or attempting to change the regional balance of power.
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