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The ACT report in this issue discusses the course of the Egyptian crisis in case of escalation or halt. It presents an initial perspective of the repercussions, each party’s choices and likely scenarios. It also sets headlines for possible solutions by means of reconciliation efforts and initiatives if both parties are ready and the mediator acceptable. Agreement should take place according to proper basics and mechanisms of negotiation in a bid to put an end to the current crisis. However, if the situation deteriorates, it will constitute a catastrophe for Egypt, with all its components, as well as cause negative consequences to the entire Arab World and its democratic trends. The report notes that neither of the two parties has a clear vision to end the crisis, although they are both in a dilemma in terms of the construction of institutions on the part of the regime and the current methodology on the part of the opposition. Each has problems weakening its advantages and eliminating the ability to overcome the calamity. As long as there are no visions or initiatives, the political crisis will most likely escalate, theories of co-existence will stay away and economy and security will keep deteriorating. Four scenarios are suggested for the escalation. The first is a political settlement, which has good chances. The second is the current regime’s failure on the democratic, constitutional track, which has weak chances in the foreseen future. The third is the regime’s success in imposing new rules for the political game, which has a weak chance. The fourth is the country’s slide into violence, which has also weak chances in the present national scene. A number of choices are available for each party to end the crisis, with varying degrees of possible success. On the one hand, the regime may, firstly, gamble on the imposition of the status quo along with the implementation of a ‘future road map’, which is highly expected from the regime. Secondly, it may take steps to ease tension and improve its rule, such as stopping security measures, giving freedoms of expression and demonstration and returning prohibited media. Thirdly, it can accept a compromise of agreement and collective participation on the basis of national interests and the uprising’s targets, engaging all parties in an interim stage. On the other hand, the National Alliance for Supporting Legitimacy may, firstly, choose steadfastness to carry on with the peaceful rejection of the new situation, insisting on uncovering the dangers of the coup ‘against legitimacy’. Continuing with this choice is a strong possibility. Secondly, it may accept a compromise meeting most of the disputants’ demands. The coalition is most likely to take this option if there are guarantees to return the democratic, constitutional track and the solutions are proposed by acceptable parties. Thirdly, it may give in to the status quo, which currently has a weak chance. Finally, a ‘way out of the crisis’ strategy is proposed by the report within two fundamental stages: announcing a work plan for both parties as a ‘declaration of good intent and Trustbildung’, and agreement on major principles for a solution and future setting. The report also suggests mechanisms to implement the strategy and makes recommendations to end the crisis for all relevant parties.
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