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|a fre
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|b المغرب
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|9 49748
|a Tarbalouti, Essaid
|e Author
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|a Défaut de Paiement, Comportement de Sauve- Qui-Peut et Traitement Des Creanciers
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|b جامعة القاضي عياض - كلية العلوم القانونية والإقتصادية والإجتماعية
|c 2015
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|a 139 - 166
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|a بحوث ومقالات
|b Article
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|b This article analyzes the economic efficiency of legal rules of bankruptcy. It aims to answer the following question : do the legal rules of bankruptcy allow an efficient solution to the problem of sauve-qui-peut or opportunistic behavior inherent in bankruptcy firm? I adopt a model of games theory between two creditors. I define the condition of strategic behavior emergency and demonstrate who bears the cost. I analyze the impact of legal rules on the reduction of the strategic behavior. I demonstrate none of these rules of law is adequate to solve the problem of bankruptcy efficiently. I provide a new rule of contrat, and show how my analysis of the contrat infuence the strategic behavior.
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|a الاقتصاد
|a القانون
|a الاقتصاد المغربى
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692 |
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|b Legal Rules
|b Behavior Opportunistic
|b Default
|b Economic Efficiency
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|4 الاقتصاد
|4 القانون
|6 Economics
|6 Law
|c 012
|l 053
|m ع53
|o 1326
|s المجلة المغربية للاقتصاد والقانون المقارن
|t Moroccan Journal of Economics and Comparative Law
|v 000
|x 0581-6073
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856 |
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|u 1326-000-053-012.pdf
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|d y
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|a EcoLink
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|a IslamicInfo
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|c 781578
|d 781578
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