520 |
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|b The Russian role in response to the Syrian revolution has raised several questions since the beginning. For instance: what are the motives? Why is it limited to Syria but exclusive to similar cases like Libya? Is it related to specific ties with Bashar Al-Assad’s regime? Is it part of Putin’s more inclusive Middle East strategy to reshape the New World Order, by ending the unipolarity, which has ruled since the early 1990’s in the wake of the USSR, and making use of the relative decline in the US foreign policy, especially in Obama’s time? On the other hand, questions arise with regard to the policy targets, such as: Is it exclusive to security and strategic aspects? Or does it have economic objectives? Then, one wonders about the mechanisms employed. For instance, did they only start with direct military intervention in 2015? Or were there previous techniques? Did such intervention coincide with difficulties faced by the regime in confronting the opposition forces, which actually advanced in several areas? After that, the intervention is assessed in terms of achieving the targets and the major obstacles. Finally, how much possible is a settlement? Could such a settlement be made with coordination between Moscow and Washington? Will it guarantee keeping or removing Al-Assad? The present study departs from a basic hypothesis that the Russian role managed to impose an internal reality for the favour of the regime. It defeated the rebellion under assistant regional and even international conditions as well as decline by other parties, like the US. Now, 55% of the country is controlled by the regime and 25% by the Syrian Democratic Forces supported by Washington, while the rest is distributed between the opposition and ISIS. Thus, the above hypothesis is proven to be true. Therefore, any political settlement will be affected by such military dimensions. It should be arranged in coordination between Moscow, the main player, and Washington, which only has 3 targets: eliminating ISIS, reducing Tehran’s influence and securing Israel’s border. So, the latter does not mind keeping Al-Assad and limiting the opposition’s role as long as any settlement guarantees these goals.
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