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Prepared by the Arab Crisis Team (ACT), the present report GCC’s Crisis with the Arab Spring investigates the nature and dimensions of the Gulf Cooperation Council states’ handling of the Arab uprisings as well as their options and possible scenarios. It also reviews the strengths of these countries to overcome the crisis. Finally, a number of policies are proposed and recommendations made to resolve the situation in a way that serves the return of stability to the region, away from the verge of chaos and collapse. In the introduction, it is mentioned that the above states and the Arab World have gone through significant developments throughout the last decade, mainly the outbreak of the Arab Spring late 2010. The GCC members considered the fall of the regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen a political loss for their own. Their early reading of the new shifts actually warned that they would not find good alternatives. The major worries of the crisis may be as follows: -Negative impacts on the internal situation of the GCC states -Extreme concern of the collapse of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes and the fear of the same destiny to other allied governments -Rivalry between regional axes, and -Classifying the winning governments in the Arab Spring states within a Turkish-Qatari ally. The repercussions to the GCC states may be summarized as follows: -Weakened internal structures and relations due to the disparate stands on the Arab Spring -Mostly Playing the role of the opposition to the Arab Spring before the Arab public opinion -Decline of their Arab and regional influence, by not being able to adopt a unified regional policy in dealing with each of Tehran and Ankara, as well as ignoring the Iranian nuclear issue assumed by the US, and -Rising Iran’s geo-strategic weight and threat to the GCC, forcing these states to deal with some regional matters in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain according to such a progress. Three scenarios are set for the future of the crisis: halt, persistence of the status quo and escalation. Accordingly, the options open to the parties in terms of its repercussions and possible scenarios are as follows: -Reaching understandings, which would put an end to the concerns and move the parties to minimum cooperation -Shifting from confrontation and instability of the region, while allowing a margin for political difference, and -Continuing the conflict to resolve it by defeating and completely excluding the political Islam powers from the scene, or the failure of such efforts. Upon exploring the dimensions, possible scenarios and open options, it is found that there is a chance before the GCC states to overcome the crisis, due to their possession of the following strengths: -Vital and strategic interest for a way out of the crisis in light of the failure of violence and the expanding influence of extremist militias -Persistence of welcoming of the GCC states’ role as a strategic one by the parties backing the uprisings and political reform projects -Anti-uprisings powers’ reliance on financial and security support from the GCC states, but without having any internal potential for continuity, and -Lack of decisiveness in the stand of Western countries on Arab Spring as well as their readiness to deal with any shifts as long as they do not pose a threat to the Western direct interests. In conclusion, a number of recommendations are made to the GCC states to help find a way out of the calamity with the Arab Spring countries and powers, restore stability in the region and end the bloodshed, violence, terror, extremism and takfir. Among these are the following: -Coordinating and unifying the GCC states’ stands -Reconsidering the GCC internal matters on joint bases with the least of united attitudes -Attempting to halt all acts of violence, killing and bloodshed in the Arab World, even temporarily until new policies are adopted to accomplish permanent security and stability -Setting a target of comprehensive stability, as well as resuming development programmes as a foundation for GCC stands and policies, so they could become general Arab policies -Setting up and supporting a public-public, public-official and official-official reconciliation project by an Arab team of specialists and wise individuals acceptable by all the countries -Developing an overall approach to end the Yemeni crisis, which constitutes a direct menace to the security and stability of the GCC states, and -Calling on Jordan, as a close ally, to launch a model of comprehensive internal accord, consolidate its national front and adopt structural constitutional and legal reforms. That would make Amman prevent the GCC states from backing any Arab party against another in any Arab Spring countries in light of the destructive conflicts sweeping them.
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